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I

n 1980, a Diplomatic Conference convened by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in Geneva was successful in drafting a Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
l
Effects ("Conventional Weapons Convention"). Three Protocols, each relating
to a specific weapon or group of weapons, were attached. The Conventional
Weapons Convention was opened for signature at the United Nations
2
Headquarters in New York on April 10, 1981. The United States did not sign
it until April 8, 1982, and since then has ratified only the Convention and two
of the Protocols? The Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols
received the necessary twenty ratifications and accessions by June 2, 1983,4 and
5
entered into force six months later on December 2, 1983.
The purposes of this Article are (1) to determine why these instruments were
considered necessary; (2) to analyze the provisions of the Convention and of the
three Protocols; and (3) to ascertain in what manner ratification will be in the
6
best interests of the United States.

Introduction
As long ago as 1868, the Preamble of the Declaration of St. Petersburg set
forth a number of "limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the
requirements ofhumanity.,,7 These limits included the following:
That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as
possible the calamities of war;
That the only legitimate objects which States should endeavour to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men;
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That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their deaths inevitable; [and]
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of

. 8
humaruty.

Articles 22 and 23(e) of the Regulations Attached to the 1899 Hague
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,9 and
the same articles of the Regulations Attached to the 1907 Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, 10 include the following
humanitarian rules:
Article 22: The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited. 11
Article 23 (e): In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions,
it is especially prohibited12 [or forbidden]: To employ arms, projectiles, or material
of a nature [calculated] to cause unnecessary suffering. 13
Unfortunately, despite the vast increase in the nature and lethality of weapons
which occurred during the course of the subsequent seven decades, the only
international agreement prohibiting or restricting specific conventional weapons
which became effective during that period was the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, 14
prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gases and bacteriological weapons. 1S
Prior to the Diplomatic Conference that took place in Geneva between 1974
and 1977,16 the work of which culminated in two additions to the four 1949
17
Geneva Conventions (only one of which will concern this Article 18), the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") had sponsored a number
of preliminary conferences, the last of which was a Conference of Government
Experts that met in 1972. Although those conferences were concerned with the
reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflicts, and not with prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific
conventional weapons, at the conclusion of the 1972 conference a group of the
government experts suggested that the ICRC should arrange a special meeting
to consult with legal, military, and medical experts on the question of express
prohibitions or limitations of the use ofsuch conventional weapons as may cause
19
unnecessary suffering or be indiscriminate in their effect.
Complying with this suggestion, the ICRC convened meetings of a selected
group of experts in March and June 1973. These meetings of experts did not
attempt to formulate concrete proposals, but sought merely to document the
20
weapons which required consideration. Five categories of weapons were
classified as causing unnecessary suffering or being indiscriminate in their effects:
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1) small-calibre projectiles; 2) blast and fragmentation weapons; 3) time-delay
weapons Qand mines and booby traps); 4) incendiary weapons; and 5) potential
weapons development?1 It will be found that these experts chose well and that
the weapons in these five categories continued to constitute the subject of
discussions in the various subsequent conferences on this matter, up to and
including the conference that drafted the Conventional Wea~ons Convention
and Protocols which were the ultimate result of these labors. 2
The Diplomatic Conference that met in Geneva for the first time on February
20,1974 (and did not complete its work until June 10, 1977), established an Ad
Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons, whose terms of reference called
23
for it to "discuss weapons without making any substantive or drafting decisions.
This Committee functioned throughout the four sessions of the Diplomatic
Conference?4 While the Ad Hoc Committee made no substantive
recommendations, during the final Plenary Meetings the Diplomatic
Conference adopted a resolution recommending that a conference be held not
later than 1979 to reach "agreements on prohibitions or restrictions on the use
of specific weapons. 1I25
The General Assembly of the United Nations took note of that resolution
and adopted its own resolution, convening in 1979 a United Nations conference
26
on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons.
Preparatory conferences met in 1978 and 1979, and the Conventional Weapons
Conference met for the first time in Geneva from September 10, 1979, to
September 28, 1979. The Conference met again from September 15, 1980, to
October 10, 1980. At this latter session it completed the drafting of a
Conventional Weapons Convention and three Protocols annexed to that
Convention. 27 This Article will focus on the meaning and intent of the
Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols in order to determine
whether there are valid reasons for the United States and other major military
nations to ratify such instruments which advance the humanitarian law of warinstruments that, moreover, such nations played a major role in drafting.

I. The Conventional Weapons Convention
The Conventional Weapons Convention itself may truly be termed an
"umbrella" convention. It contains no substantive humanitarian provisions,
those being the subject matter of the three Protocols which are annexed to it.
It has several provisions, however, that are either controversial or unusual.
Article 1 makes the Conventional Weapons Convention and its annexed
Protocols applicable in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions?8 This is certainly not a controversial provision, although
it would have been preferable to restate the article itselfin full, a practice followed
29
elsewhere in the Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols. It then

356

Levie on the Law of War

proceeds to make them applicable in "any situation described in paragraph 4 of
Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to these Conventions. ,,30 This provision of
the 1977 Additional Protocol I, making an internationallaw-of-war convention
applicable in conflicts involving national liberation movements (theretofore
considered to be internal in nature), is one of the major reasons why the United
States has not ratified this latter instrument. Although the present author agrees
with the objection of the United States to this provision in the 1977 Additional
Protocol I, primarily because it was the basis for Article 44(3) of that Protocol
which removed the historic requirements for distinguishing legal combatants
from members of national liberation movements, the latter provision has no
effect on the Conventional Weapons Convention or its Protocols. There is no
question here of hiding one's personal weapons from view, concealing oneself
among civilians preparatory to an attack, or wearing no visible distinguishing
insignia. Anyone whose State or "authority" has agreed to be bound by any of
these Protocols who thereafter violates the humanitarian provisions thereof will
be guilty of a war crime, whether he be a uniformed soldier in an international
or civil war, a rebel in a civil war, or a member ofa national liberation movement
31
in hostilities against the colonial power. While ratifying the Conventional
Weapons Convention, the United States could easily express its displeasure with
32
this provision by way of an understanding or, as France has done, by making
. 33
a specific reservatIon.
Article 2 is concerned with the relation of the Conventional Weapons
Convention and its Protocols to other international agreements, affirming that
they do not detract "from other obligations imposed upon the High Contracting
Parties by international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict." This
provision appears to be superfluous inasmuch as there is nothing in these
instruments which could possibly have that effect. If anything, they "add to,"
they do not "detract from" other obligations?4
Article 3 (Signature) is a part of the standard boilerplate of international
agreements, as are Articles 5 (Entry into force), 6 (Dissemination), 9
(Denunciation), 10 (Depositary), and 11 (Authentic texts)?5 Naturally, some of
these articles contain variations from the standard to meet the particular
circumstances of the Conventional Weapons Convention.
Article 4 (Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession) begins in the
standard fashion, but paragraph 3 requires discussion. It provides:
Expressions of consent to be bound by any of the Protocols annexed to this
Convention shall be optional for each State, provided that at the time ofthe deposit
of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval of this Convention or of
accession thereto, that State shall notifY the depositary ofits consent to be bound
by any two or more of these Protocols.36
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Apparently, the United States construes this provision as authorizing reservations
and understandings. At the time of signing, the United States said:
In addition, the United States ofcourse reserves the right, at the time ofratification,
to exercise the option provided by Article 4(3) of the Convention, and to make
statements of understanding and/or reservations, to the extent that it may deem
necessary to ensure that the Convention and its Protocols conform to humanitarian
.
37
and mill·tary reqUIrements.

Inasmuch as the Convention contains no prohibition against reservations or
understandings, it is somewhat difficult to understand why the United States
considered it necessary to announce its construction ofArticle 4(3) as specifically
. that ng
. ht. 38
granting
Furthermore, paragraph 3 contains a rather unusual provision in that when a
State becomes a Party to the Conventional Weapons Convention "that State
shall noti~ the depositary of its consent to be bound by any two or more of these
Protocols." 9 There was thought to be good reason for this provision. As shall be
noted, the 1980 Protocol I, concerned with nondetectable fragments, was
completely noncontroversial, and it could be expected that many States might
ratify the Conventional Weapons Convention and Protocol I only. Article 4
compels States to give more consideration to the other two Protocols, and thus,
it prevents States from ratifying only the Conventional Weapons Convention
and Protocol I and thereafter claiming the status ofParties to the Convention. 40
In addition to a provision rejecting the general participation (si omnes) doctrine
contained in Article 7 (1),41 Article 7 contains a number of other provisions with
respect to treaty relations between the Parties. Unfortunately, not content with
the provision addressing national liberation movements (termed an "authority")
contained in Article 1, the Conference found it necessary to include further
lengthy special provisions on this subject in Article 7(4), in an attempt to link
the Conventional Weapons Convention with the four 1949 Geneva
42
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol 1.
The 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I are comfletely irrelevant to
the Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols.4 Those instruments
do not contain prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional
44
weapons. Clearly, these special provisions were another attempt to secure for
national liberation movements the benefits of all of the humanitarian law of war
upon an undertaking by an "authority" that is rarely able to control the activities
of the members ofits movement and that uses the civilian population as a military
objective rather than as something to be protected. France, like the United States,
is not a Party to the 1977 Additional Protocol I and had no difficulty in making
45
a reservation to Article 7 (4) (b) of the 1980 Convention. There is no reason
46
why the United States should not make a similar reservation, ifit is so minded.
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Moreover, it is ofinterest that, while Common Article 3(4) of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions (with respect to anned conflicts not of an international character)
and Article 4 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I both provide that the application
of those instruments does not affect the legal status of the Parties, no such
provision was included in the Conventional Weapons Convention. 47
Notably, one subject that is missing from the Conventional Weapons
Convention that is probably more important in a humanitarian law-of-war treaty
than in most types of treaties (other than a disannament treaty) is the question
ofverification. Efforts to include such a provision were strongly and successfully
. d.48
reslste
II. 1980 Protocol I

The 1980 Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments ("Protocol I") 49 is a single
sentence which provides that "[i]t is prohibited to use any weapon the primary
effects of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape
detection by X_rays.,,50 This Protocol was directed primarily against weapons
made of such materials as glass and plastic. The United States had become a
cosponsor of the proposal for this Protocol, which was adopted unanimously.51
One of the U.S. Delegates attributed the unanimity "in part to the fact that no
mill··
. such a weapon. ,,52
.
one seems to have had any senous
tary mterest m
Accordingly, the United States is justified in ratifying this Protocol.
III. 1980 Protocol II

The 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby Traps and Other Devices ("Protocol II,,)53 is concerned with the
"time-delay" weapons referred to by the 1973 Conference of Government
Experts. 54 Such weapons include: 1) anti-vehicle and antipersonnel land mines,
hand-buried or delivered by aircraft, artillery, or naval guns;55 2) booby traps;
and 3) other devices. While the 1980 Protocol II was more controversial than
Protocol I, it was without question of greater importance.
Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol II, entitled Material Scope of Application,
makes clear that its subject matter is limited to the use of the aforementioned
weapons on land only ("including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway
crossings or river crossings") and that it "does not apply to the use of anti-ship
mines at sea or in inland waterways. ,,56 Although there appears to have been
little controversy involved in the drafting of this article, its importance cannot
.
d .57
b e overestlmate
Article 2, entitled Definitions, defines "mine," "booby-traps," and "other
devices." It provides:
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1. "Mine" means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other
surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity
. " means any
or contact 0 f a person or ve hi cIe, 58 and " remoteIy deIivere d nune
mine ... delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from
an aircraft. 59
2. "Booby-trap" means any device or material which is designed, constructed or
adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs
or approaches an apparendy hannless object or performs an apparendy safe act. 60
3. "Other device" means manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed to
kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote control or automatically
after a lapse of time. 61
Inasmuch as this definition of "other devices" contains no examples and, unlike
the procedure followed with respect to the other weapons covered by this
Protocol, no additional article deals exclusively with "other devices," it is likely
that there will be controversy regarding exacdy which weapons were the
intended target of this provision.
Article 2(4), defining "military objective," appears to have engendered no
controversy. It reads:
"Military objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by
its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 62
Article 2(5) was essentially unnecessary, as its content follows from Article
2(4). It defines "civilian objects" as "all objects which are not military objectives
as defined in paragraph 4.,,63
Finally, Article 2(6) defines "recording" as "a physical, administrative and
technical operation designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in the
official records, all available information facilitating the location of minefields,
mines and booby-traps."
Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the 1980 Protocol II set forth general restrictions on
the use of all of the weapons covered by the Protocol: mines, booby-traps, and
other devices. The main objective of their provisions is to protect both the
64
civilian population and individual civilians from the effects of these weapons.
There appears to be very litde in their provisions that could be considered
controversial. The provision ofArticle 4 requiring "the posting ofwarning signs"
and "the issue of warnings" of the location of mine fields, however, is somewhat
unrealistic. 65 To a large degree, the value of mines is that the progress of an
attacking force is slowed up by the need to search for, locate, and neutralize
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minefields and individual mines. This advantage is lost if the minelayer is obliged
to make public to all, which necessarily includes the enemy, the location of
mines that have been laid. 66 Moreover, the provisions of Article 5 presume an
accuracy for remotely-delivered mines which may be incorrect. While the
requirement for a self-actuating or remotely-controlled mechanism which
renders a mine harmless (mechanisms which have long been employed on sea
mines) would, in general, be a protection for the civilian population, one might
wonder whether the safety of civilians is jeopardized when that mechanism is
one which causes the mine to destroy itselfby exploding without warning. 67
Article 6 of the 1980 Protocol II, establishing prohibitions on the use of
booby-traps,68 is a very important provision for the protection of civilians,
particularly children. It provides:
1. Without prejudice to the rules ofinternational law applicable in anned conflict
relating to treachery and perfidy, it is prohibited in all circumstances to use:
(a) any booby-trap in the fonn ofan apparendy harmless portable object which
is specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material and to
detonate when it is disturbed or approached,69 or

(b) booby-traps which are in any way attached to or associated with: (i)
internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals; (ii) sick, wounded
or dead persons; (iii) burial or cremation sites or graves; (iv) medical facilities,
medical equipment, medical supplies or medical transportation; (v) children's toys
or other portable objects or products specifically designed for the feeding, health,
hygiene, clothing or education of children;70 (vi) food or drink; (vii) kitchen
utensils or appliances except in military establishments, military locations or
military supply depots; (viii) objects clearly of a religious nature; (ix) historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or
spiritual heritage of peoples; (x) animals or their carcasses.
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any booby-trap which is designed to
..
cause superfluous illJUry
or unnecessary suffc·
enng. 71

Introducing Article 6(1) with the phrase "Without prejudice to the rules of
international law . . . relating to treachery and perfidy" was an unfortunate
decision. 72 Despicable as many booby-traps have been, they have not generally
heretofore been considered to be either treacherous or perfidious?3 Obviously,
it was not intended that this Protocol would declare all booby-traps treacherous
and perfidious. Had that been the intention, the lengthy enumeration would
have been unnecessary?4 Notwithstanding, the quoted phrase will
unquestionably be used, on occasion, as the basis for an argument that any
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particular booby-trap is both treacherous and perfidious and, therefore, a
violation of the law of war. 75
Article 7 of the 1980 Protocol II amplifies the definition of "recording"
contained in Article 2.16 It includes some of the provisions which were
exceedin~1 difficult to draft, primarily because of the technical problems
involved. In addition, there was strong support for a provision requiring the
exchange of full information between belligerents concerning the location of
minefields immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, paragraph
(3)(a)(i) of Article 7, requiring the belligerents "to take all necessary and
appropriate measures" to protect civilians immediately after the cessation of
hostilities,78 represents a compromise reached because a number of nations were
unwilling to require a belligerent, some ofwhose territory might still be occupied
at the time of the cessation of hostilities, to make available to the occupier the
location of minefields which might become valuable in the event that there was
a resumption of hostilities. However, under sub-paragraphs (3)(a)(ii) and (iii) of
that article, where there is no occupied t.erritory, or where troops occupying
enemy territory have withdrawn therefrom, there is no discretion involvedrecords of minefields and booby-trapped areas must be made available to the
other Party and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.19 It is
appropriate to point out here that, based on a proposal made by Morocco, there
is a Technical Annex to Protocol II containing guidelines on recording which
are to be "taken into account.,,80 With regard to the Technical Annex the
United States has said:
(1) its provisions are not mandatory or uniformly applicable in all circumstances,
but only "guidelines" which are to be "taken into account"; (2) the items of
information listed in the Annex are of a sufficiently general character so as to be
operationally practicable and to provide sufficient flexibility; (3) the Annex relates
solely to information needed to establish the location of minefields and does not
require disclosure oftechnical characteristics ofthe mines used; and (4) the addition
of the Annex provides the assurance that the recording obligations of the Protocol
would in any event be satisfied if the items of information Listed in the Annex
are recorded. S1

In view of the many, many casualties caused by mines after the cessation of
hostilities, particularly among civilians, there should be no relaxation of the rules
governing the maintenance ofcomplete records with respect to mines laid during
the course of hostilities and the availability of those records to all concerned at
82
the earliest possible date.
Article 8 of Protocol II deals with the protection of United Nations forces
and missions from the minefields, mines, and areas of booby-traps established
by the belligerent parties prior to the arrival of a United Nations peacekeeping,
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83
observation, or other similar mission. Its provisions appear to be completely
reasonable and noncontroversial. When United Nations peacekeeping or
observation forces are involved, extensive protection from minefields and
booby-traps (removal, other measures, and providing the necessary information)
is required; when a United Nations mission is involved, the belligerent party
. h protectIon
. from th ose weapons. 84
must proVl·d·
e It WIt
Finally, Article 9 deals with the very important subject of international
cooperation in the removal of minefields, mines, and booby-traps. 85 At the end
of World War II an international organization was established for the removal
of sea mines,86 but the failure to take any concerted international action with
respect to land mines and booby-traps resulted in accidental deaths and injuries
.
to mnocent
Cl·vili·ans L.
J..or many years thereafter. 87
To summarize, while the 1980 Protocol II is not a perfecdy drafted
international agreement, there is nothing objectionable in its contents that, if
deemed necessary, cannot be taken care of with simple statements of
88
understanding. There does not appear to be any reason why the United States
should not accept it. 89
IV. 1980 Protocol III

The 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use ofIncendiary
Weapons ("Protocol III") 90 is unquestionably the most controversial of the three
Protocols. The early opposition of the United States to prohibitions or
restrictions on the batdefield use of incendiary weapons was used by the Soviet
delegation "to foster the impression in most quarters that this was the basic
obstacle to a successful conclusion of the Conference.,,91 Undoubtedly, it is the
implications of this Protocol, rather than its content, that make the United States
reluctant to ratify the Conventional Weapons Convention.92 Despite the fact
that Protocol III contains no prohibition or restriction on the use of napalm
(other than the general prohibitions and restrictions on the use of incendiary
weapons) or on the use of any incendiary weapons against combatants,93 and
despite the fact that the negotiating history is to the contrary, it may be
considered inevitable that, when the occasion arises, the claim will be advanced
that both of these are banned by Protocol III.
Article 1 of Protocol III sets forth a series of definitions. It is particularly
notable that while the definition of incendiary weapons includes the
enumeration "flame throwers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs
and other containers of incendiary substances," it also enumerates what are not
such weapons: "illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems ... munitions
designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an
additional incendiary effect ... and similar combined effects munitions.,,94
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Protocol III has only one other article. Drafting it was probabl~ one of the
9
most difficult tasks that the Conference and its organs encountered. One major
issue had been resolved by excluding combined-effects munitions ("CEMs")
from the ambit of the term "incendiary weapons.,,96 Although the word
"napalm" was heard again and again during the discussions conducted with
respect to this Protocol and was included in a number of proposals, 97 nowhere
in Protocol III will one find that word used. This issue was resolved by
eliminating all mention of napalm, thus permitting its use against combatants
but not against civilians or civilian objects, which are protected against all
.
di ary attac ks .98
mcen
Article 2 is of such importance that it warrants complete quotation:
1. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such,
individual civilians or civilian objects the object ofattack by incendiary weapons. 99

2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located
within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary
weapons.
3. It is further prohibited to make any military objective located within a
concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary weapons
other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such military objective
is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions
are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective
and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
4. It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds ofplant cover the object ofattack
by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover,
conceal or camoufla~ combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves
military objectives.!
The prohibition contained in the second paragraph perhaps encompasses too
much. It encourages the establishment of military objectives which are valid
military targets within cities, towns, and villages, (all concentrations of civilians)
thus immunizing the military objective from attack by air-delivered incendiary
10l
The drafters would
weapons, perhaps the only appropriate means of attack.
have been better advised to use the provisions of Article 57 (2) (a) of the 1977
102
Additional Protocol I as the basis for the provisions of this paragraph.
However, this is a problem which could be readily corrected by a reservation,
or even by an understanding.
The insertion of the phrase "other than air-delivered incendiary weapons"
in paragraph 3 of this article was unnecessary and renders the provision
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ambiguous. It was probably meant to indicate that this paragraph was intended
to cover all the possibilities not covered by paragraph 2 of the same article.
However, this phrase could validly be construed to mean that under the stated
circumstances (a military objective within a concentration of civilians) attacks
by all types of incendiary weapons, except by ("other than" by) air-delivered
incendiary weapons are prohibited-even though (or perhaps because) that
procedure had been specifically prohibited by the previous paragraph. Was it
intended thereby to exempt from the prohibition contained in the previous
paragraph air-delivered incendiaries under the circumstances set forth in the
"except" clause? Or was it intended thereby to exclude air-delivered incendiaries
from the "except" clause itself? These are but a few of the interpretations to
which that phrase lends itsel£ Any acceptance of Protocol III should include an
understanding that clearly sets forth what the use of that phrase is believed to
have been intended to accomplish.
To summarize, as far as it goes, the 1980 Protocol III is an extremely
humanitarian agreement which contains nothing irreparable of either a political
or a military nature that warrants the refusal of the United States and other major
military powers to accept it.

Epilogue
When the United States signed the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention
in 1982 it stated:
The United States Government welcomes the adoption of this Convention, and
hopes that all States will give the most serious consideration to ratification or
accession. We believe that the Convention represents a positive step forward in
efforts to minimize injury or damage to the civilian population in time of anned
conflict. Our signature of this Convention reflects the general willingness of the
United States to adopt practical and reasonable provisions concerning the conduct
.
1:.
'
ofmili' tary operatIons,
Lor the purpose .0 f
protectmg
noncombatants. 103
More than a decade later, on March 21, 1994, the Secretary of State
transmitted that Convention and Protocols I and II to the President with a
recommendation for ratification by the United States with the four following
conditions:
1. The United States considers that the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the
present Convention, which reproduces the subject of provisions of Article 35,
Paragraph 3 and Article 55, Paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol I [to the 1949
Geneva Conventions], applies only to [s]tates which have accepted those
provisions;
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2. The United States declares, with reference to the scope of application defined

will apply the provisions of the
all armed conflicts referred to in Articles 2 and 3 common

in Article 1 of the present Convention, that it
present Convention to

to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949;

3.

The United States declares that Article

7,

Paragraph 4(b) of the present

6,

Paragraph l(a) of Protocol

Convention will have no effect; and
4. The United States understands that Article

II

to

the present Convention does not prohibit the adaptation of other objects for use
as booby_traps.l04

The President transmitted the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and its
Protocols I and II to the Senate on May 12, 1994, recommending that the Senate
give its advice and consent to their ratification subject to the above stated
conditions. lOS He deferred action on Protocol III pending further examination
concerning its acceptability from a military point of view. 106 On March 24,
1995, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the
Convention, Protocol I, and Protocol 11. 107
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Weight, Nov. 29-Dec 11, 1868, St. Petersburg, reprinted in 1 AM.]. INTLL. SUPP. 95 (1907), and in Schindler
& Toman, supra note 1, at 102.
8. Id.
9. 32 Stat. 1803,1817 (1903), T.S. No. 403, reprinted in 1 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, at 247 (C. Bevans, ed., 13 vols., 1968-1976) [hereinafter
Bevans], alld ill Schindlcr & Toman, supra note 1, at 63.
Sccrctary ofStatc Warrcn Christophcr has described the Hague Conventions of1899 and 1907 as
significant treaties attempt[ing] to reduce the suffering caused by armed conflicts and to provide
protection to the victims of war, including the civilian population and members of the armed forces
who have becn woundcd or capturcd. They are an attempt to rcduce the inevitable suffering and
damage present during any war in a manner consistent with legitimate military requirements.
88 AM.]. INT'L L. 748, 749 (1994). The first Conference in 1899 reduced a number of existing customs on
the rules and laws of war to written form. Basically, the second Conference in 1907 made few changes in the
1899 Regulations. Today, these rules are collectively known as the Law of The Hague.
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10. 36 Stat. 2277, 2301-02 (1911), T.S. No. 539; 2 AM. J. INT"L L. SUPP. 190 (1908); reprinted in 1
Bevans, supra note 9, at 631, and in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 63.
11. Id.
, 12, See Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 82.
13. To the same effect, see 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection ofVictims ofIntemational Armed Conflicts (protocol I, Geneva,June 8, 1977,
art. 35(1)-{2) [hereinafter 1977 Additional Protocol I] in 1 Swiss Federal Political Department, OfficW Records
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977, Part 1, at 116 (1978) [hereinafter OfficW Records], 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.LM. 1391, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 621.
14. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in
Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 115; see also 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling ofBacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 26
US.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 164, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 137 (using these weapons
was not prohibited or restricted by the 1972 Convention-thls was accomplished by the 1925 Geneva Gas
Protocol).
15. Contrary to the beliefS of some, neither the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of
the Victims ofWar, see itifra note 17, nor the 1977 Additional Protocol I has provisions containing prohibitions
or restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons.
16. The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Diplomatic Conference] met from 1974 to 1977.
17. There are four 1949 Geneva Conventions, See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition ofthe Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S,T. 3115, 75 U.N.T.S.
31, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 373 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention], Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members ofArmed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1,
at 401 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at
423 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention], Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at
495 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
18. See 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13.
19. International Committee of the Red Cross, Conference of Government Experts on the
Reaffirmation and Development ofInternational Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: 2 Report
on the Work of the Conference, Annexes 115, 116 auly 1972).
20. International Committee of the Red Cross, Weapons that may Cause Unnecessary Suffering or have
Indiscriminate Effects: Report on the Work of Experts, paras. 11 and 12 (1973). It must be borne in mind
that, despite the occasional efforts of a few individuals, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons were never
considered to be areas open for discussion in any of the conferences to which this Article refers.
21. Id. at cbs. III-VII.
22. "Small-calibre projectiles" was the only weapons category to fall by the wayside. A working paper
on the subject (AICONF.95/CW15) was submitted at the Conventional Weapons Conference by Sweden.
This was followed by a "Summary of the technical consultations in the Informal Working Group on
Small-calibre Weapons Systems (AICONF.95/CW 18); then this subject disappeared except for a resolution
adopted near the end of the 1979 session of the Conventional Weapons Conference. See 1979 Report of the
Conference to the General Assembly, (AICONF.95/8), Oct. 8, 1979, at 51 [hereinafter 1979 Conference
Report]; and Final Report of the Conference to the General Assembly, (AICONF.95/15), and Corr. 1-5,
Oct, 27,1980, at 10 [hereinafter 1980 Final Report]. It is understood that acrual field tests conducted by the
experts failed to substantiate the Swedish thesis that small calibre weapons tumble and tear more than larger
calibre weapons, and therefore, cause more suffering than the larger projectiles, Thus, further srudy was
considered necessary before any action could be recommended with respect to these weapons. Of course, the
category "potential weapons development" constiruted an academic discussion of weapons not yet in the
arsenal of any nation, Perhaps the weapons which fall within the ambit of the 1980 Protocol I to the
Conventional Weapons Convention are in t¥S category.
23. 16 Official Records, supra note 13, at 5. It will be found that these limitations on the activities of the
Ad Hoc Committee were evenrually disregarded. See id. at 551-627.
24. Concurrently, the ICRC sponsored two Conferences on the subject. See Report of the Conference
of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, Lucerne, 1974 (1974) [hereinafter
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Lucerne Conference]; Report of the Conference of Government Experts on the Use ofCertain Conventional
Weapons, Lugano, 1975 (1976).
25. Resolution 22(IV), Follow-up Regarding Prolu"bitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons, 1 Official Records, supra note 13, at Part One, 215-216 and Part Two, 52-53.
Committee I of the Diplomatic Conference had adopted a provision on the subject for inclusion in the 1977
Additional Protocol I, CDDH/I/SR. 77, 9 Official Records, supra note 13, at 481-88, but that provision had
been rejected by the Plenary Meeting, 7 Official Records, supra note 13, at 33.
26. G.A. Res. 32/152, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. NO. 45, at 57, U.N. Doc. Al32145 (1977),
reprinted in [1977] 31 Y.U.N. 43, U.N. Sales NO. E.79.l.l, and in 16 UNITED NATlONSR:EsOLUTIONS 529
(DusanJ. Djonovich, ed. 1984) [hereinafter Djonovich]. For some reason, despite the more specific tide that
the General Assembly gave to its agenda item, the resolution bears the tide "Incendiary and other specific
conventional weapons which may be the subject ofprohibitions or restrictions ofuse for humanitarian reasons."
27. Seegenerally 1980 Final Act, supra note 1.
28. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 17, art. 2.
29. For example, Article 7(1) of the Conventional Weapons Convention is a restatement of the first
sentence of Article 96(2) of the 1977 Protocol I.
30. Article 1(4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, states that "[t]he situations referred to
in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination ... " Once
again, it would have been preferable to include the entire provision-but any attempt to do this would probably
have increased the non-palatability of the provision tenfold!
31. It is possible that the claim will be made, as it has sometimes been made with respect to Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 17, that if the State involved in a civil war, or a war of
national liberation, is a Party to the Conventional Weapons Convention and some or all of its Protocols, the
provisions of those instruments are automatically binding upon its adversary, whether or not an "authority"
has taken any action with respect thereto. This is based on the theory that all of the nationals of a State Party
to an international agreement are bound by the provisions thereof. On the other hand, rebels have generally
denied that they are bound by the acts of a government that they are seeking to overthrow.
32. See S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONGo REc. 4568 (1995) (declaring that "the United
States will apply the provisions of the Convention, Protocol I, and Protocol II to all armed conflicts referred
to in Articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of August 12,
1949"). The United States may contend, as it does with respect to the provision in the 1977 Additional Protocol
I, that this provision will protect terrorists. Such a contention has no Validity with respect to the 1977 Additional
Protocol I-and it has even less validity here.
33. The French reservation (made upon signature) states, "with reference to the scope of application
defined in article 1 of the [Conventional Weapons Convention], that it will apply the provisions of that
Convention and its three Protocols to all the armed conflicts referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949." MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARy-GENERAL 833, 834 (1991), 20 I.L.M. 1287 (1981) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES] (noting
reservations, declarations, and statements of signatory nations), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1,
at 193-94. No Party to the Conventional Weapons Convention is known to have taken exception to the
French reservation, though it excludes the reference to the 1977 Additional Protocol I and national liberation
movements.
34. Nevertheless, one commentator has found it necessary to allocate three pages of discussion to this
subject. Elmar Rauch, 71te Protection if the Civilian Population in International Armed Cotiflicts and the Use if
Landmines, 24 GERMAN Y.B. INT"L L. 262, 264-66 (1981). The present author does concur with Rauch's
finding that the Conventional Weapons Convention is not a supplement to the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Id. at 265. Another commentator states that "[t]he purpose of this Article is to exclude the a contrario line of
argument whose adherents might claim that anything not specifically prohibited in the Convention is allowed."
A.P.V. Rogers, A Commentary on the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use if Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices, 26 MIL. L. & L. WAR. REv. 185, 188 (1987).
35. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A, arts. 3, 5, 6, 9-11.
36. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A, art. 4.
37. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 33, at 832, 835, reprinted in Shindler & Toman, supra note 1,
at 192,196.
38. Perhaps the United States was making two separate statements: one setring forth its intent to exercise
the option of not ratifying all three protocols, and another reserving the right to make statements of
understandings andlor reservations. Indeed, if this were so, the U.S. could have made its intent much
clearer-e.g., by the use of a semi-colon instead of a comma after the words "article 4(3) of the Convention."
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39. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A art. 4 (emphasis added).
40. The United States had suggested mandatory acceptance of all three Protocols. 1980 Report of the
United States Delegation to the Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
13 [hereinafter 1980 Report of the United States Delegation]. The actions of States in ratifYing or acceding
to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention would seem to indicate that the fear which engendered this
provision was unwarranted. As ofJanuary 1, 1992, thirty-one States had ratified or acceded to the Convention.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 33, at 832-33. Every State had also ratified or acceded to all three
Protocols, with the exception of Bonin, which did not approve 1980 Protocol II, and France, which did not
ratify 1980 Protocol III. Id.
41. This provision, contained in Article 7, is similar to the provisions of Common Article 2(3) of the
1949 Geneva Conventions. See supra note 17. It continues the practice of reversing the procedure contained
in the 1907 Hague Conventions which were not effective ifany single belligerent was not a Party to a particular
Convention-a provision erroneously applied by Justice Pal in his dissent in the trial before the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East. See HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAw OF WAR CRIMES
152 (1993).
42. The provisions adopted were actually mild compared to those sought by the African group ofnations.
Interestingly, the United States did not object to these provisions at the Conventional Weapons Conference.
Instead, the United States insisted that the Convention only apply to internal conflicts if the "authority" of
the liberation movement "had accepted and applied the rules of warfare which already apply to States as a
result ofvanous international agreements." 1980 Report of The United States Delegation, supra note 40, at
14. This meant that an "authority" could not take advantage of the Convention unless it had accepted and
applied certain rules of warfare concerning, among other things, the treatment of prisoners and the protection
of noncombatants." Id.
43. It is suggested that it would have been more appropriate merely to make the Conventional Weapons
Convention and the Protocols, which were previously approved by the State involved in the conflict, applicable
when the "authority" had agreed to accept and apply them.
44. The Assistant Director of the ICRC's Department of Principles of Law, Yves Sandoz, has stated that
the Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols "are valuable, or rather indispensable, supplements
to the 1977 Protocols." Yves Sandoz, A New Step Forward in International Law: ProhibitiollS or RestrictiollS 011 tile
Use of Certain Conventional WeapollS, 21 INT'L REv. REo CROSS 3, 16 Oan.-Feb. 1981). Absent in the
Conventional Weapons Convention is a provision similar to Article 1(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I,
specifically stating that it supplements the 1949 Geneva Conventions. While the Convention and its Protocols
supplement the 1977 Additional Protocol I in the sense that they contain law-of-war provisions not contained
in that Protocol, they are completely independent and have no other relationship thereto. States can be Parties
to the Conventional Weapons Convention and some or all of its Protocols without being Parties to the 1977
Additional Protocol I. States cannot be Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I without being Parties to the
1949 Geneva Conventions. See 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 92,
45. Upon signing the Conventional Weapons Convention, France made a reservation stating:
[A]s regards the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949, the declaration of acceptance and application
provided for in article 7, paragraph 4(b), of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions, .. will
have no effects other than those provided for in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, in so
far as that article is applicable.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 33, at 833-34, 20 I.L.M. at 1287 (1981), reprinted in Schindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 193-94. Once again, no Party is known to have taken exception to France's reservation. Article
3 common to the Geneva Conventions sets forth rules applicable in wars "not of an international
character"-i.e. civil wars.
46. Indeed, the Senate made such a reservation when it ratified the Convention. S. Res. 4568, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONGo REc. 4568 (1996).
47. Upon signing the Convention, France made an interpretive statement that the application of the
Convention would have no effect on the legal status of the parties to the conflict. MULTILATERAL ,TREATIES,
supra note 33, at 833,20 I.LM. at 1287 (1981), reprinted ill Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 193.
48. France, Italy, the United States, and the People's Republic of China made statements deprecating
this omission upon signing the Conventional Weapons Convention. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 33,
at 833-35, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 192-96.
49. Protocol I Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. B, 19 I.L.M. 1523,1529 (1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note
1, at 185 thereinafter "Protocol r'].
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50. !d.
51. 1979 Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or
Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to have Indiscriminate Effects 5 [hereinafter 1979 Report of the United States Delegation]. The 1980
Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 5, states: "The proposal does not, however, preclude
nonmetallic casing materials or other parts or components which are not designed as the primary wounding
mechanism."
52. Matheson, Remarks, 1979 PROC. A.S.I.L. 156, 157. See also W J. Fenrick, The Law ofAnned Cotif/ict:
TI,e CUSHIE WeapoIIS Treaty, 11 CAN. DEF. Q. 25 (Summer 1981). The then Major Fenrick states £lady
that this Protocol "bans a weapon which does not exist." !d. at 27. He also explains that "CUSHIE is an
unofficial Canadian acronym derived from the words 'Causing Unnecessary Suffering or Having Indiscriminate
Effects'." !d. at 30 n.2.
53. Protocol II Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, 19 I.L.M. 1523, 1529 (1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note
1, at 177, 185 [hereinafter "Protocol II"].
54. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The 1956 Draft Rules are the source of many of the
provisions of both Protocol II and Protocol III. Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the
Civilian Population in Time of War (2d Ed. 1958), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 251.
55. It is important to note that while land mines are primarily a defensive mechanism intended to impede
enemy movement, the infliction of casualties being an incidental result, such mines are now also used
offensively. Burrus M. Carnahan, TIte Law ofLand Mine Warfare: Protocol II to tlte United Nations Convention on
Certain Convetltiolutl Weapons, 22 MIL. L. & L. WAR REv. 117, 120-22 (1983) (citing Lucerne Conference,
supra note 24, at 229).
56. Protocol II, 1980 Final Act supra note 1, app. C, 19 I.L.M. at 1529, reprinted in Schindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 185. It is unfortunate, that advantage was not taken of the opportunity to draft international
legislation restricting the use of sea mines, parricularly on the high seas, restrictions which are long overdue.
See HOWARD S. LEVIE, MINE WARFhREAT SEt. 52-53 (1992).
57. Despite the fact that Article 49(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, specifically states
that the provisions of that Section apply "to all attacks from the sea .•. against objectives on land but do not
otllenvise tiffed tlte rules of international law applicable in armed cotif/ict at sea," (emphasis added), one author has
found that the provisions of the Section "apply to all acts of naval warfare which may affect the civilian
population." RAUCH, THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TOTHE GENEVA CONVENTIONS: REPERCUSSIONSONTHE
LAw OF NAVAL WARFARE 57-60 (1984). The quoted provisions should preclude any such contention with
respect to the 1980 Protocol II.
58. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 180.
59. Id. One commentator hazards the opinion that in the future most land mines will be laid by aircraft,
rockets, or artillery. Carnahan, supra note 55, at 123.
60. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 180.
61. !d. This provision appears to consider as being inhumane manually-emplaced "other devices" which
include exacdy the mechanisms which are required in remotely-delivered mines. See supra text accompanying
note 59. The logic of the distinction is difficult to understand.
62. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 185.
This provision obviously had as its basic source paragraph 2 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of
International Law in 1969, entided The Distinction Between Military Objectives and Non-Military Objects In General
alld Particularly tile Problelns Associated Witll Weapons ofMass Destruction, 66 AMJ.INT'L. L. 470, 470-71 (1972),
reprillted ill Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 265. Its immediate source was Article 52(2) of the 1977
Additional Protocol I, supra note 13.
63. 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52(1).
64. See Rogers, supra note 34, at 187. One commentator, a member of the United Kingdom Delegation
at the Conventional Weapons Conference states: "The Conference was concerned, therefore, with finding
ways of protecting the innocent from the dangers of mines and booby traps while at the same time preserving
this important means of self-defence." Id.
65. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1531(1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1,
at 186.
66. Rogers, supra note 34, at 193 (labeling provision as "merely hortatory").
67. These various mechanisms are frequendy used when the armed force which delivers the mines from
a remote source anticipates that its troops will need to traverse the mined area in the near future.
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68. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 6(1)(b)(v), 19 I.L.M. at 1532 (1980), reprinted in Schindler
& Toman, supra note 1, at 187.
69. See Rogers, supra note 34, at 199. With respect to this provision: "There is no reason why booby-traps
should not be prefabricated so long as they are not in the shape of a harmless, portable object. What the
Conference had in mind to prohibit were booby-traps made to look like watches, cameras, pens or other
attractive items. It did not prohibit the booby-trapping of existing attractive items." rd. In other words, a
belligerent may booby-trap a camera, but it may not manufacture booby-traps which appear to be cameras.
70. The Working Group proposal referred solely to "children's toys." AlCONF.95!3, Annex II, at 9;
1979 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 51, app. D. The Committee of the Whole added
the rest ofitem 1 (b) (v), probably having in mind events in Afghanistan where the booby-trapping of objects
intended for children's care caused countless children to be killed or maimed.
71. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 6, 19 I.L.M. at 1532 (1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 187.

72. ld.
73. During World War II the Germans were particularly adept at preparing booby-traps; but no German
was tried on the charge that such an act was treacherous or perfidious and a violation of the law of war.
74. An example of a booby-trap that would be legal, even under the 1980 Protocol II, is one made as
part of a land mine which would cause the mine to explode ifattempts were made to move it or to deactivate
it before its own internal mechanism causes it to deactivate or self-destruct. These would not fall within the
definition of "other devices." 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 3(1)(C), 19 I.L.M. at 1530 (1980),
reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 185. The Germans used such booby-traps in their sea mines
and in various types of aerial bombs dropped on Great Britain during World War II, and no charge was ever
made that such action had been treacherous or perfidious.
75. Article 37 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I states "[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary ..•
shall constitute perfidy." 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 37, 16 I.L.M. at 1409 (1977), reprinted
in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1. The rare cases in which a booby-trap might be used in connection with
such an invitation are certainly covered in Article 6(1) of Protocol II.
76. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 7, 19 I.L.M. at 1532-33 (1980), reprillted in Schindler &
Toman, supra note 1, at 187-88.
77. 1980 Report of The United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 6-7.
78. rd.
79. rd. During the 1982 conflict in the Falklands (Malvinas) the Argentines sowed plastic mines
indiscriminately and without recording their locations. This resulted in many casualties occurring after the
cessation of hostilities. V. ADAMS, THE FhLKLANDS CONFLICT 60 (1988).
80. 1979 Conference Report, supra note 22, at 22-23. Morocco was plagued with explosions of World
War II mines and booby-traps for many years after the termination ofthat conflict, as were other North African
countries. C£ G.A. Res. 35/71, U.N. GAOR 2d Corom., 35th Sess., 83rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
Al35!592!AddA (1980), reprinted in 19 Djonovich, supra note 26, at 311 (recognizing that most developing
counrries exposed to wars waged by colonial powers suffer loss of life and property as a result of mines).
81. 1980 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 7-8.
82. See, e.g., Cauderay, Anti-Personnel Mines, 33 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 273 QulyAugust 1993). See also
ARMs PROjECT OF HUMAN RiGHTS WATCH, LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, passim (1993).
83. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 8,19 I.L.M. at 1533 (1980). reprinted in Shindler & Toman.
supra note 1. at 188.
84. See L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 133 (1993). Following the Gulf
War, military personnel, under the auspices of the Security Council resolutions, sustained severe casualties
during cleaning operations as Iraq failed to keep proper records of the locations of minefields. rd. Negligence
in keeping such records also resulted in numerous injuries to civilians after the cessation of hostilities in
Cambodia and the Falklands. ld.
85. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 9, 19 I.L.M. at 1534 (1980). reprillted in Shindler & Toman.
supra note 1. at 188.
86. International Agreement for the Clearance of Mines in European Waters, Nov. 22.1945, reprillted
in 3 Bevans, supra note 9, at 1322. Following World War II, German prisoners of war were used to remove
land mines laid by the Germans in France. This resulted in a number of casualties. Because of that experience.
Article 52(1) of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of war may not be compelled to
undertake dangerous labor and specifically states that the removal of mines falls within this category. See Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 17, at art. 52(1)(3). During the Falklands (Malvinas) War it was alleged that
the British were violating this provision. Howard S. Levie, The Fa/klallils Crisis alld the Laws oj War, ill THE
FhLKLANDS WAR: LESSONS FOR STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 64, 73 (Alberto R. ColI
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& Anthony C. Arend, cds., 1985). Investigation revealed that Argentine prisoners of war had volunteered to

mark a stock of Argentine mines which had been stored at a location close to their prisoner-of-war camp.
87. Carnahan, supra note 55, at 126, cites three post-World War II treaties containing provisions with
respect to the removal of land mines: Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command, on the One Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in
Korea, Panmunjom, Korea,July 27, 1953, art. II(13(a), 4 U.S.T. 235, T.I.A.S. No. 2782, reprinted in 4 MAJOR
PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 2657 (Fred L. Israel, ed. 1967-1980) [hereinafter Israel) (calling for
removal of all minefields by the commander of the side whose forces emplaced them); Agreement on Ending
the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam: Protocol Concerning the Cease-fire in South Viet-Nam and the
Joint Military Commission, Paris,Jan. 27,1973, art. 5, 24 U.S.T. 38, pt.1., 39; T.I.A.S. No. 7542, reprinted
i/l 5 Israel 92, 93 (requiring each party to do its utmost to complete removal or deactivation of all mine-fields
and traps within fifteen days after cease fire); Appendix to Annex I of the Treaty of Peace Between the Arab
Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, Washington, March 26,1979, art. VI(4), 18 LL.M. 362, 382-83,
reprillted in 5 Israel 331, 349 (agreeing that Israel will make efforts to destroy or remove minefields in areas
from which it withdraws).
88. See S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONGo REc. 4568 (1996) (ratifYing Protocol II with
understanding concerning Article 6(1». But see Rauch, supra note 34, at 286-287 (stating that provisions of
1977 Additional Protocol I and of 1980 Protocol II relating to mines are incompatible). It is submitted that
Rauch's conclusion is based on an overly critical analysis. Nevertheless, this would not present a problem to
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Addendum

Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restridions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
have Indiscriminate Effects is entitled Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
ofMines, Booby Traps and Other Devices. While it contains a number of valuable
provisions for the protection of civilians, its provisions were considered
inadequate and it is estimated that there are, today, close to 100,000,000 land
mines buried in countries around the world and that every day a number of
innocent civilians are accidently killed or maimed by such weapons. Their value
for both defensive and offensive purposes makes it difficult to convince the
representatives of governments that they should be banned. One solution is to
require that all land mines become inert after a specified period of time. In May
1996 an amended Protocol was drafted, which requires that they be detectable,
and self-destructable or self-deactivating. Also, they must be removed at the
cessation of hostilities. Perhaps another solution is to require that all land mines
be so constructed that they will only explode when subjected to a pressure of a
set number of pounds, one which will exceed the weight of an individual or a
civilian automobile. (At the same time a Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons
(protocol IV) was drafted placing restrictions on the use of laser weapons
specifically designed to blind.)

